Recently, the Ligue 1 club Paris Saint-Germain (PSG) was ordered by a French labour court to pay the popular striker Kylian Mbappe a whopping €60 million in 3 months of unpaid salary and bonuses. Yet, this wad of cash was a drop in the bucket for Mbappe. It is estimated that after achievement bonuses, such as goals scored, he nets in around €100 million annually, ignoring other forms of income like advertising. Additionally, Mbappe’s move to Real Madrid involved a signing bonus of €150 million paid across 5 years.
In a world where everyone is worried about the cost-of-living crisis happening globally, well-known professional football players like Mbappe are being paid an astounding amount of money weekly. Dominant clubs around the world are focusing on signing and bringing in already-proven players instead of taking risks by fostering their own academy graduates. This further causes a skillful player’s price tag to be inflated higher.
Looking at the English Premier League, their first record transfer after their formation in 1992 was the selling of player Paul Gascoigne from Tottenham Hotspur to Italian club Lazio for £5.5 million in 1992 (equivalent to £12.2 million today). However, the current transfer record was broken this season (2025-26 season) by the signing of Liverpool forward Alexander Isak from fellow English club Newcastle United for £125 million.
(The image Liverpool used to announce the signing of Alexander Isak for £125 million)
In just about 33 years, the English transfer record was smashed 15 times. The record has increased by a jaw-dropping 910%[1], compared to cumulative inflation of 165%. It shows that players now are getting paid way more than those of the past. But the quality of the players who are valued at such fortunes now is arguably the same as or worse than their counterparts in the past. Legends such as Rooney, Aguero, Shearer, Lampard, and so many more are considered to be in the “Top-10 Premier League Players of All Time” by both fans and mainstream pundits, while current players are less likely to be featured in those lists.
In a time where players with €100 million valuations are more common than ever at the highest divisions, we must ask: does this spending race benefit the sport, or is it a detriment to its growth?
[1]: based on previously mentioned figures
Chapter 1: The European Money Structure
In the world of European football, the highest honour a club can achieve is winning the UEFA Champions League (UCL). For “weaker” leagues, like those in Bulgaria, Wales, and Lithuania, the winners of their respective leagues do not qualify for the Champions League, as the name suggests. Instead, they would have to fight other champions of “weaker” leagues in different qualifying rounds. Only the winners of the qualification play-off round progress to the competition proper, while the knocked-out clubs qualify for the European second-tier competition (UEFA Europa League) or the European third-tier competition (UEFA Conference League).
An example would be Maltese champion Hamrun Spartans. By winning the domestic league, the club joined the first qualifying round, in which they beat Lithuanian club Zalgiris in a gruelling penalty shootout, with the final shootout score being 11-10. They then progressed to the second qualifying round, only to be battered by the well-known Ukrainian giants Dynamo Kyiv 6-0.
It shows that qualification for such a prestigious tournament is difficult for clubs from “weaker” leagues. Instead, for “stronger” leagues like LaLiga, the English Premier League, and the German Bundesliga, usually the top 4 clubs qualify for the competition proper, instead of battling it out in qualifying rounds.
The only problem? Money.
By progressing further in the tournament, clubs are awarded a larger share of the prize pool. The prize pool of €2.5 billion is shared such that qualifying for the competition proper awards a club €18 million. However, for clubs losing during qualification, like Hamrun Spartans, they are awarded an estimate of €175,000 only. As Arsenal (an English team) is leading the table, assuming they win the Champions League undefeated, they are awarded a bare minimum of €103.9 million, nearly 590 times greater than the money guaranteed to Hamrun Spartans.
Even though Arsenal has to pay more in regard to wage bills, stadium maintenance, community initiatives, and other programs, compared to Hamrun Spartans, giant clubs like Arsenal attract sponsors with larger budgets. For Arsenal, their main sponsor is Emirates, an airline with the personal backing of Dubai’s ruler, Sheikh Maktoum. Furthermore, Emirates posted a revenue of $34.8 billion in 2025, ensuring that their sponsorship budget is large enough to accommodate the ever-increasing price to have their branding posted on the front of Arsenal jerseys sold worldwide. Additionally, Arsenal is owned by American billionaire magnate Stan Kroenke, ensuring that they have enough money to purchase the greatest contemporary players and focus on developing young talent in youth leagues.
All of this shows that the most well-known clubs, which are already wealthy, hoard more wealth for themselves by dominating European competitions with their massive budgets. They can sign the brightest up-and-coming players, while not having to worry about being unable to pay their steep wage requirements, further contributing to the rise in a player’s valuation. This only serves to harm more grassroots leagues in Europe, like the Maltese Premier League.
For a club to succeed in European competitions, they need players who are able to compete at that stage. Luckily for Hamrun Spartans, they successfully qualified for the UEFA Conference League, guaranteeing a massive payout of €3.2 million, but not all clubs that were knocked out of the Champions League were lucky enough to qualify for other UEFA European competitions. An example is the Georgian club FC Iberia, who were knocked out of qualifying for both the UEFA Champions League and the UEFA Conference League, resulting in the club earning only around €200,000.
When a club gets such a small payout relative to other more successful clubs from UEFA, their only opportunity to generate revenue for the upkeep of their facilities is from their national football league’s prize money and ticket sales at home games. Both of which are unpredictable and vary year-on-year.
The current European financial structure only benefits those at the top, while not supporting the growth and success of clubs also competing at their country’s highest division, albeit not being as competitive as the best leagues in Europe. The “meritocracy” format of prize money only serves the clubs that already have enough quality players and coaches to continue deep into the tournament, while alienating the clubs coming from leagues with less money involved.
When a meritocracy only benefits those with pre-existing wealth and success, doesn’t it show that the European money structure isn’t benefiting all clubs equally, as UEFA wanted it to?

(a screenshot from a video showing the celebrations when Hamrun Spartans qualified for the Conference League)
Chapter 2: Spend, Spend, Spend
Before the beginning of a new season, each league has their own transfer window. This period of time allows players to be both bought and sold seamlessly, while giving ample time for the receiving club to document, register, and most importantly, publicise their new signing. In these expensive windows, clubs are bound by multiple rules set internationally. The most important being Financial Fair Play (FFP).
As stated before, the English Premier League had its transfer record broken 15 times, but these expensive signings are only for single players, not for entire clubs. Looking at the spending of each club in the League, one club jumps out in net spending over the rest.
This club is Chelsea.
Born near the River Thames in London almost 121 years ago, Chelsea plays at Stamford Bridge, bolstering a squad with the likes of Palmer, Estevao, Garnacho, and more globally-recognised players. However, since the arrival of their new CEO Todd Boehly in 2022, Chelsea have gone on a spending spree, spending over £1 billion on new players.
(an infographic on the net spend of Chelsea compared to other clubs)
With the arrival of Boehly, another American multi-billionaire, Chelsea was now owned by a company called BlueCo. BlueCo spent a whopping £4.25 billion to purchase the club from its previous owner, while pledging another £1.75 billion to further development. Additionally, BlueCo spent a relatively tiny €75 million to purchase French top-flight club Strasbourg.
Ever since BlueCo’s takeover, Chelsea have only managed to produce two major trophies. The first was an expected win in the UEFA Conference League, and the second was an upset win in the inaugural FIFA Club World Cup. In this competition, Chelsea defeated UEFA Champion League winners PSG in the final. Even though these achievements are major, they both occurred in 2025 only. All the years before, Chelsea had not won any major silverware, while placing in unsatisfactory positions at the end of the Premier League season.
Discontent among fans and executives over the poor string of results has led Chelsea to sack their manager a grand total of 6 times, with the latest being the voluntary departure of Enzo Maresca, the man who won them both trophies. Replacing him was Strasbourg manager Liam Rosenoir. This yet poses another question:
Is it ethical to transfer players and managers through clubs owned by a consortium?
For Strasbourg supporters, their dedicated manager, who fought hard for them to achieve a spot in European competition, was stolen by Chelsea. Rosenoir himself personally rejected several approaches by other clubs, loyal to his Strasbourg. However, under the directive of BlueCo, Rosenoir was moved from the “feeder-club” of Strasbourg to the main club of Chelsea. The vocal supporters of Strasbourg were evident in their discontent.
From a BBC Sport report:
Strasbourg-based L’Equipe journalist Cyril Olives-Berthet says BlueCo have “shot themselves in the foot”.
“The general opinion is utter shock,” he told BBC Sport. “Even people who thought there was some interesting stuff with BlueCo are shocked.
“BlueCo had a relatively good image around France after last season. That is Rosenior, the players and the style of play.
“The backlash is harsh, in the media and with football fans.”
The consortium ownership style also poses serious questions for the longevity of FFP regulation, which is crucial for the survival of weaker clubs in money-rich leagues like the English Premier League.
When FFP was introduced, it was a safeguard to prevent clubs from overspending in competition with one another. However, clubs such as Manchester City (also owned by football consortium City Football Group) were charged with 115 separate violations, while Chelsea is still scot-free. They achieve this by shady accountancy.
Mykhailo Mudryk, a Ukrainian Chelsea player, was signed for £88.5 million. However, to prevent a sudden spike in their transfer booklets, Mudryk was signed on an eight-and-a-half year contract, totalling £11 million a year. This shady tactic is known as amortisation. With this, Chelsea were able to sign a total of 32 players in their first-team squad. They almost have enough players to field 3 separate teams! This results in Chelsea having several talented players fighting for a starting spot. A prime example is 4 players all competing for the same spot on the left wing, including Mudryk.
Football clubs are becoming playpens for billionaires. Their wealth is able to support the expensive nature of the sport, yet the growth of the sport is diminishing. When ticket prices are jacked high to maximise shareholder value instead of lowered to ensure everyone has a fair chance to watch, we need to seriously decide whether football is:
Money or Entertainment.
Conclusion: Football – Money or Entertainment
“In like wise foote balle, wherin is nothinge but beastly furie and extreme violence” – Sir Thomas Elyot
In the medieval era, football was described as a violent and overly aggressive sport, with it being banned by numerous Kings in England. However, King Henry VIII possessed in his royal closet the world’s first pair of football boots, made of pure leather. Even though the Kings before him and after him decided to outlaw football and promote the benefits of archery, his love for football from his courting days still existed.
However, during the height of his reign, King Henry VIII decided to follow his predecessors in prohibiting football as he deemed football a distraction for men against more crucial activities, like warfare, while still being inherently violent. Yet, the undying love of kicking a ball around still persisted throughout each regent’s ban.
Eventually, the rules of football became codified, and its illegality was no longer in question. Since then, the sport has evolved from one of seemingly mindless aggression to one of tactics. From the beginning, football was a spectacle to the audience. The thought of people pushing and shoving each other, forcing one another into the dirt for a chance of kicking a ball made of bladder was enticing to the audience.
Everyone, from the nobility to the peasantry, enjoyed watching and partaking in the sport. Mary Queen of Scots was said to have watched her retinue play football for 2 hours each day, in a nimble but skilful way, in which no foul play was involved. Football has entertained the world from its medieval inception, without the presence of any referee, to the highly strategic and wealthy game of today.
(a replica of the leather boots ordered by King Henry VIII)
Is it a question why football is called The World’s Game?
Yet, when football is treated by the richest people in the world as an investment tool with the side-product of being enjoyable every weekend, instead of a proper sport, the conflicts between players and the rich outsiders are distinct. The main example of this is Manchester United in the English Premier League.
Manchester United was historically the most dominant club in the world from around 1990 to early 2010. Its brilliance captivated the world, with a distinct flavour of football. However, when their most decorated manager, Sir Alex Ferguson retired, their fall from grace was widely documented, with blame pinned on the Glazer family, owners of the club.
The Glazers formed a company called Red Football and started with a 2.19% stake in the company, slowly increasing and ramping up their purchase of the club until they reached above 75% ownership, ending the club’s private limited company status, and removing it from the London Stock Exchange. Only to relist the company on the New York Stock Exchange years later.
For fans, the ownership from a business-minded individual signalled the end of the club, with some protesting and chanting “die, Glazer, die”. Meanwhile, other supporters broke away from the club, forming a new club called “FC United of Manchester”, which until today is 100% owned by the fans. The transition from a football-centric approach to a business approach caused the club to significantly fall in performance.
(an image depicting the protests of fans due to Glazer ownership of Manchester United)
The main goal of the club transitioned from one of local dominance to pushing products. In 2010, five years after the Glazers’ takeover, ticket costs exceeded £50, a drastic increase from the £29.90 before the takeover. The motive for their ownership is monetary, with United prioritising their brand over football.
United has also developed a marketing plan where each region has a set of sponsors, while a group of companies are global sponsors. This allows United to have different sponsors for the same category in different areas of the world. Thus, United’s sponsorship revenue has increased heavily, while further cementing the most important aspect of the club – their brand.
While on-field success has suffered terribly, with the serial winners of the League now being buried in the middle of the pack, advertising revenue has exploded. A minimum deal of £900 million was signed by Adidas and United, allowing Adidas to be the kit sponsor of United. The money all of this generates goes back into signings decided by the Glazers, instead of the manager. Ruben Amorim, the most recent manager from United before his removal, said:
“I am going to be the manager of this team, not just the coach. That is going to finish in 18 months and then everyone is going to move on. I came here to be the manager.”
This highlights how football was never the priority of the management. They want more lucrative sponsorship deals, focusing on finding more partners willing to pledge large amounts of money, instead of dealing with the declining performance of the club.
In the end, when something that is meant to be for enjoyment gets plagued by the burden of money and profit, its enjoyability dies as a consequence. The United fans, who frequently enjoyed the success of their club in the past, have now become the starkest critics. Their anger, coupled with their frustration, echoes a harrowing image.
Football has become money.
